Arsenal deployed a makeshift striker against Man Utd – what they needed was a false nine

What’s the difference between a ‘false nine’ and a ‘makeshift striker’?

There are no obvious rules here and, at times, there’s minimal difference between the two. But a false nine is not, strictly speaking, simply playing someone up front who isn’t accustomed to that position — that’s a makeshift striker. A false nine theoretically leads the line but actually drops off and plays as a midfielder rather than a forward.

The distinction is relevant in light of Arsenal, who have been forced to play in recent weeks without either Gabriel Jesus or Kai Havertz — or, for that matter, their first-choice wide pairing of Bukayo Saka and Gabriel Martinelli. It’s not surprising they’ve struggled in the final third — although they did hit seven goals at PSV in midweek.

Mikel Arteta has turned to Mikel Merino up front. He proved a useful Plan B when scoring two late goals in a 2-0 win at Leicester City and also scored at PSV. Merino is a curious option up front. As a midfielder who is partly renowned for his tendency to break into the box and provide an aerial threat, he has seemed more makeshift striker than false nine — he is basically acting as a target man. And that was partly Arsenal’s problem against Manchester United, who were starting the defensive trio of Matthijs de Ligt, Victor Lindelof and Leny Yoro for the first time.

First, let’s go back to Brighton & Hove Albion’s 3-1 victory at Old Trafford in January. This was possibly the most any opposition coach has exposed Ruben Amorim’s beloved 3-4-3. Brighton’s head coach Fabian Hurzeler was, on paper, playing two strikers and two wingers. But the two strikers, Danny Welbeck and Joao Pedro, played deep, essentially at the top of a box midfield, which meant United’s centre-backs had no one to mark. Meanwhile, Brighton’s wingers, Kaoru Mitoma and Yankuba Minteh, played high up behind United’s wing-backs.

Brighton’s opening goal showed perfectly how this approach could be effective — Yoro and De Ligt were drawn forward towards Joao Pedro and Welbeck, the defence was dragged out of shape, and Mitoma ran in behind, collected a long ball, and squared for a Minteh tap-in.

Granted, you can also find examples of United struggling in the air — in the first half of the 2-0 home defeat against Newcastle United shortly after Christmas, for example. But in terms of exposing United’s system, playing without anyone in the centre-forward position is a viable way to play.

So this was possibly a game where Arsenal not having any proper strikers shouldn’t have been an issue. Some of their brighter moments, in terms of combination play, came when Merino found himself between the lines rather than up top.

In this situation, Merino collects the ball up against Lindelof but drifts into a deeper position before chipping the ball past Lindelof, who isn’t sure what is behind him. Declan Rice has made a good run but can’t quite control the pass in mid-air.

Here’s another good situation for Arsenal. Merino has again positioned himself more as a midfielder than as a striker, meaning Lindelof is the highest of United’s five defenders. This creates space for someone to exploit and Riccardo Calafiori motors in behind from left-back. Unfortunately, Martin Odegaard doesn’t spot his run.

And Merino proved useful at breaking United’s press, too, when overloading the centre. Here, David Raya is under pressure but has a simple ball through midfield into Merino, who then carried it half the length of the pitch.

Merino’s only shot of the game, meanwhile, came when he started away from the centre-forward role and then turned up there unannounced, much as he does when playing in midfield.

But Arsenal didn’t do this enough. Of course, Merino needed to offer some variety to avoid becoming predictable, but there’s no chance he could make anything of a ball like this, chipped onto the head of an opposition defender, with two other United players in close attendance.

So what could Arsenal have done instead?

Here, Merino briefly finds himself by the right touchline after winning a throw and stays there to play a one-two with the taker, Jurrien Timber. That means Arsenal are temporarily forming a diamond midfield — Thomas Partey at the base, Merino to the right, Rice to the left and Odegaard at the top. And, for the first time, United look uncertain about how to pick up in midfield.

Lindelof, accustomed to getting tight to Merino, points at Odegaard, then throws his arms out as Odegaard receives the ball under no pressure. Odegaard, in fairness, could have been braver in taking his pass in his stride rather than turning back. But effectively using four midfielders caused a problem.

Otherwise, Arsenal made life easy for Lindelof and the other centre-backs. It made sense for Merino to be in centre-forward positions when the ball was wide because he’s an aerial threat. But when Arsenal were building up through the middle, Manchester United’s defenders had no problems — Merino wasn’t going to spin in behind.

The runs in behind were going to come from others. And here’s a good example of how Merino might have caused more problems if he’d been positioned deeper.

William Saliba is about to chip the ball over Lindelof and in behind for Rice. Lindelof’s primary job is to get tight to Merino, but because Merino is playing as a centre-forward, Lindelof can do both — he can watch Merino, then retreat and win the header against Rice. If Merino had been dragging him up — as he was for the aforementioned Calafiori run — Rice might have reached this pass, or at least forced De Ligt over to cover.

There’s no use blaming Merino, who was doing his job manfully up against three centre-backs, and it seems harsh to be critical of Arsenal’s depleted attack after their huge midweek win.

But more unpredictability and movement was the order of the day against a United defence prone to getting dragged around. Arsenal needed a false nine, not a makeshift striker.

(Top photo: Michael Regan/Getty Images)