‘The Reds have got no money, but we’ll still win the league’, sung to the tune of Freed from Desire, is a regular refrain among Liverpool fans about the realities of the FSG business model.
It’s equal parts defiant and ironic. In 2023-24, Liverpool had the Premier League’s second-highest wage bill behind only Manchester City. Worldwide, only four teams had bigger payroll expenses.
And remember, the club-record £386m that Liverpool spent on wages came in a season when they were not in the Champions League, which massively reduces bonus payments to players.
When their accounts for 2024-25 are released, their return to the Champions League plus bonuses for winning only their second league title of the Premier League era will likely mean they surpass Man City as the biggest payers in England.
In global terms, Barcelona and Real Madrid will probably have more modest outlays than Liverpool too. Only Paris Saint-Germain, who despite abandoning the galactico model are still comfortably the biggest spenders in the wage department, will be ahead of the Merseysiders.
But by other metrics, the ‘Reds have got no money’ chant expresses something real about Fenway Sports Group (FSG), the ownership group based five time zones and 3,000 miles away in Boston.
Do Liverpool really have ‘no money’ to spend?
The song is all in good fun, of course, but the players are certainly aware of the sentiment behind it.
Mohamed Salah is among the stars who’ve been spotted singing it, though the Egyptian King’s richly-deserved but mind-bendingly big £400,000-a-week contract might undercut the message somewhat.
However, amortisation – which is how football clubs account for transfer fees over a period of time – is lower at Liverpool than it is at Chelsea, Man City, Man United, Arsenal, Tottenham and Aston Villa.
When the 2024-25 figures are out, the gap between the Reds and those six clubs will widen, while Newcastle will probably surpass them too.
Overall squad cost, which is comprised of both wages and amortisation, is probably a fairer metric. But here too, Liverpool are behind Chelsea, City and United. Arsenal meanwhile are catching up fast.
| Club | Squad cost (2023-24) |
| Manchester City | £578m |
| Manchester United | £555m |
| Chelsea | £530m |
| Liverpool | £500m |
| Arsenal | £499m |
| Tottenham | £358m |
| Aston Villa | £349m |
| Newcastle United | £316m |
As a percentage of revenue, City, United, Arsenal and Spurs are all spending less on wages.
This might be the most relevant statistic when it comes to deciphering how FSG run Liverpool as a business. The wages-to-turnover ratio has risen in lockstep with revenue since 2020.
Credit: Adam Williams/TBR Football/GRV Media
John Henry, Tom Werner, Mike Gordon and the rest of FSG have put exactly zero money into the football side of Liverpool F.C.
What they have invested in is upgrades to Anfield and commercial talent, which in turn has driven up revenue to reinvest in transfers and a wage market where player power reigns supreme.
They have created value, not subsidised the club or let any manager or sporting director spend beyond their means.
At times – as Salah and Virgil van Dijk can attest – this has led to frustrations among the fanbase about contract negotiations allowed to drag on or fallow seasons in the transfer market.
FSG would argue that everyone else within football’s economy is the problem, not them. Unlike most, their model is sustainable and has delivered silverware:
- 2x Premier League
- 1x Champions League
- 1x Club World Cup
- 2x FA Cup
- 3x League Cup
That is why they have attracted the highest calibre of investors.
Liverpool just one club in FSG investor’s £9.5bn football empire
Liverpool now have one of the broadest equity bases in football and sport in general.
In layman’s terms, that’s the number of shareholders in the business from whom they can theoretically raise money.
John Henry is FSG’s and by extension Liverpool’s biggest individual shareholder, controlling about 40 per cent. But there are dozens of investors in total, some individuals and others private firms.
Credit: Adam Williams/TBR Football/GRV Media
Among the latter category are Dynasty Equity, who bought a three per cent stake directly in Liverpool in 2023, Arctos and RedBird Capital.
Liverpool are not Arctos and RedBird’s only investment in football finance.
As well as dozens of agencies, media outlets and sports tech businesses, Arctos have stakes in the following clubs either directly or in their parent holding companies:
- Paris Saint Germain (Ligue 1)
- Crystal Palace (Premier League)
- Portland Timbers (MLS)
- Portland Thorns (NWSL)
Arctos also recently saw Real Salt Lake (MLS) and Utah Royals (NWSL) sold by Harris Blitzer Sports Entertainment, in whom they have a significant minority stake, for around £450m.
What’s more, RedBird are the majority owners of AC Milan (Serie A) and Toulouse (Ligue 1).
According to new research from Sportico, that means that Liverpool are now part of an ownership web valued at over £9.5bn.
| Rank | Club | Value | Revenue (23-24) |
| 1 | Real Madrid | $6.53 billion | $1.13 billion |
| 2 | Manchester United | $6.09 billion | $834 million |
| 3 | FC Barcelona | $5.71 billion | $802 million |
| 4 | Liverpool | $5.59 billion | $773 million |
| 5 | Bayern Munich | $5.21 billion | $827 million |
| 6 | Manchester City | $5.16 billion | $901 million |
| 7 | Arsenal | $4.49 billion | $773 million |
| 8 | Paris Saint-Germain | $4.26 billion | $873 million |
| 9 | Tottenham Hotspur | $3.68 billion | $652 million |
| 10 | Chelsea | $3.57 billion | $590 million |
Liverpool themselves are worth an estimated £4.2bn, PSG are said to have a value of £3.2bn, AC Milan are appraised at £1bn, while the other clubs make up the remaining £1bn-plus.
And with FSG looking to buy a new club, the value of the network of which Liverpool are a part is only heading in one direction.
That will be the start of a more traditional multi-club network, whereas the relationship with Arctos and RedBird is more diffuse, with less clearly defined links between nodes in the system.
That is an issue which regulators – at UEFA and domestic level – are looking at closely, with many experts consulted by TBR Football concerned about possible conflicts of interest.
Under Premier League rules, minority or majority ownership of more than one club in the division is not allowed.
The link between Palace and Liverpool through Arctos, however, is seen as an arm’s length relationship and not sufficient to meet the threshold for a common ownership link.
The same is true of Milan and PSG, both of whom Liverpool faced in this season’s Champions League, where similar rules on dual ownership apply.
After Milos Kerkez and Jeremie Frimpong, how much more can Liverpool spend this summer?
With all the money sloshing around in the FSG ecosystem, will some funds be diverted to Arne Slot and Richard Hughes’ transfer budget this summer?
TBR Football understands that Milos Kerkez is set to sign for Liverpool for around £40m. Talks over personal terms with the Bournemouth defender are at an advanced stage.
As well as Kerkez, Liverpool are closing in on Jeremie Frimpong from Bayer Leverkusen.
As a right wing-back, Frimpong is seen as Trent Alexander-Arnold’s long-term successor. The Reds will activate his release clause, which is worth £35m.
So, FSG have already all but committed £75m worth of transfer fees this summer.
Given that they have historically opted against paying for the bulk of transfer fees in instalments unlike some clubs, that’s a serious outlay already.
However, they likely have the capacity to spend significantly more, if the owners in Boston give their blessing.
Their financial statements show that Liverpool had just £8m cash in the bank at the end of last season, but their restraint in the transfer market this term means their coffers will be replenished by now, even factoring in the costs of Van Dijk and Salah’s new contracts.
Is PSR or FFP a factor for Liverpool?
In a word – no.
Some have suggested that Liverpool only have £45m worth of PSR headroom this summer, but that is based on a misunderstanding of the rules.
Liverpool posted financial losses of £57m in 2023-24, but they will likely have swung to a profit again in 2024-25 – and probably a relatively healthy one at that.
Assuming they break even or better across 2023-24 and 2024-25, that gives them room to post a £105m loss next season without breaching Premier League rules.
As transfers are amortised over five years for the purposes of PSR, £525m’s worth of signings would only impact the bottom line by £105m in 2024-25.
Credit: Adam Williams / GRV Media / TBR Football
Liverpool won’t spend that much but the example illustrates that domestic PSR is not a short-term factor in transfer strategy at Anfield.
UEFA’s rules are slightly tighter. However, it would take a monumental swing in the wrong direction for that system to be an issue either.
If FSG don’t sanction huge investment this summer, it will be because of their emphasis on value and market opportunities, not because they are limited by PSR or FFP.
