Manchester United thought that things could only get better when it finally parted company with Erik ten Hag — an assessment that Ruben Amorim is doing his level best to prove wrong.
But how have things gone so wrong for a candidate who was on Liverpool’s shortlist before the appointment of Arne Slot? It’s very easy, in hindsight, to say that Liverpool dodged a bullet in picking Slot over Amorim. It also probably happens to be true, at least in the sense that nobody could have fared as well as the Dutchman has done in picking up where Jurgen Klopp left off.
Perhaps any manager would have been made to look good by the imperious form of Mohamed Salah, although it’s worth noting that the Egyptian’s agent has been among those hailing Slot as “excellent” at his job. Equally, and perhaps more saliently, maybe the current iteration of United would make just about any manager look bad.
But there is an undeniably stark contrast between the fortunes of Slot and Amorim. And the factor that ultimately put Liverpool off the Portuguese coach might go some way to explaining it.
It’s widely accepted that Liverpool was swayed away from Amorim by the coach’s insistence on his three-at-the-back approach. According to The Times, internal calculations at Anfield reckoned that it would cost $515 million (£400 million) to reshape the squad in his image.
By contrast, Slot has been able to implement his approach with the exact squad left behind by Klopp, notwithstanding the 25 league minutes played by Federico Chiesa. A bigger summer is surely to be expected now that he has had the chance to run the rule over his players, but Liverpool will be buying from a position of strength — with no glaring gaps to fill, and perhaps even as the newly-crowned Premier League champion.
Maybe out of desperation, United chose to ignore the very same warning signs about Amorim. Much like Liverpool, it does not have the squad to suit a back three, and yet it ploughed ahead with the appointment.
(Image: Michael Regan/Getty Images)
If Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s cutbacks are anything to go by, then nor does it have the intention of furnishing Amorim with a $515 million rebuild. Apart from anything else, financial rules will not allow it, following three years of heavy losses and with European football slipping away (barring a Europa League triumph).
And so Amorim is doomed to keep plugging away, insisting on a formation that does not suit the squad, and insufficiently backed to truly make it click with new personnel. For evidence, it’s only necessary to look back to the January transfer window, where the coach had to settle for $32 million left-back Patrick Dorgu — after Ten Hag had been backed to the tune of over $200 million in the summer, despite a comprehensive review into his position over the summer that had resulted in only lukewarm support.
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Unless significant investment is forthcoming, it is hard to see how Amorim could ever succeed, something Liverpool foresaw in its hiring process. Yet United has put itself in a Catch-22, where cutting its losses would involve yet more expense, further restricting whichever poor soul next takes up the poisoned chalice.
By that point, United may well have a Frankenstein of a squad, half-morphed into Amorim’s vision of a three-at-the-back team and half carried over from whatever the plan was under Ten Hag. Best of luck to anyone trying to get a tune out of that.
Amorim is well within his rights to stick to his principles, and it probably gives him the best chance of long-term success — whether or not that is at Old Trafford remains to be seen. But at best, his appointment has ensured United’s road back to the top will be a particularly lengthy and tortuous one, in stark contrast to the instant glory Slot looks set to deliver at Liverpool.
